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O P I N I O N 
   
 
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge: 
 
 We consider whether the right to a speedy trial 
guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment is violated when, after an 
initial effort to apprehend the defendant, the government’s 
effort for nearly five years consists only of running the 
defendant’s name a handful of times through the National 
Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database, despite other 
available leads.  Although the authorities in this case revived 
their efforts after the five-year lull, the defendant happened to 
be caught when he was arrested on an unrelated matter.  
Applying the four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 
514 (1972), and the Supreme Court’s elaboration of those 
factors in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), we 
conclude that the government violated defendant’s speedy 
trial right.  Thus we reverse the district court’s denial of 
defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, and 
remand the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment 
with prejudice.   
 
I. 
 
 We recount the basic facts of the investigation, 
drawing from the testimony and reports before the district 
 4 
 
court detailing efforts to bring defendant Sergio Velazquez to 
trial.
1
   
 A. The drug investigation  
 
 The Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) began 
investigating Velazquez in June 2005, after receiving a tip 
that he was interested in selling cocaine to a confidential 
informant.  App. 149a. Velazquez traveled from California to 
Philadelphia to meet with co-defendant Pedro Curiel and the 
informant. App. 149a-50a.  The informant wore a wire to that 
meeting, recording discussions of a plan to sell between five 
and ten kilograms of cocaine.  App. 149a-53a. After the 
meeting, the DEA had Philadelphia police stop Curiel and 
Velazquez’s car to identify the men.  App. 150a-51a. The 
DEA learned Velazquez’s name, that he had a California 
driver’s license, and that he listed his address as a postal box 
in the greater Los Angeles area (P.O. Box 2901, Bell 
Gardens, CA, hereafter “Box 2901”).  App. 383a.  Velazquez 
was not arrested.  App. 152a.  He returned to California.   
 
 The DEA monitored the informant’s calls with 
Velazquez.  Id.  On July 27, 2005, they tracked Curiel as he 
met with the informant and then met co-defendant Nelkis 
Gutierrez-Gainza at a truck stop.  App. 152a-54a.  Gutierrez-
Gainza gave Curiel a sack and Curiel drove away.  When 
agents then stopped Curiel they recovered the sack and 
determined it contained nine kilograms of cocaine.  Id.  They 
arrested the two co-defendants. 
 
                                              
1
 We borrow the general organization of the district court’s 
thorough factual recitation. 
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 B. The initial search for Velazquez and Deputy  
  Degan’s report 
 
 The co-defendants were indicted on August 2, 2005; a 
complaint and arrest warrant issued for Velazquez the next 
day.  David Pedrini, a DEA special agent in Philadelphia, 
testified before the district court that he had a fellow agent 
from Los Angeles, Steve Pascoe, go to 6340 Woodward 
Avenue, Bell, California (“Woodward Avenue address”), an 
address that Pedrini had learned was “associated with” 
Velazquez.  App. 155a-56a.
2
  According to Pedrini, Pascoe 
spoke to a man, a woman, and two children “to see if one of 
them was Mr. Velazquez and the results were negative, he 
was not at that address.”  App. 155a.  The DEA declared 
Velazquez a fugitive, turning over the task of apprehending 
him to the United States Marshals Service office in 
Philadelphia.  App. 155a-56a.  They gave the Marshals 
Service a personal history report on Velazquez, and told 
William Degan, the office’s deputy marshal assigned to the 
case, about the Woodward Avenue address.  App. 157a.   
 
  In addition to searching for credit applications, 
department of motor vehicle reports, and records for any 
property or vehicle purchases by Velazquez, Degan entered 
the warrant into the NCIC database,
3
 and into a Marshals 
                                              
2
 It appears this link was based on registration paperwork for 
the postal box.  See App. 388a (stating that the Woodward 
Avenue address was “[t]he address listed for” Velazquez’s 
postal box). 
3
 The NCIC is an “electronic clearinghouse of crime data that 
can be tapped into by virtually every criminal justice agency 
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Service information system called the Warrant Information 
Network.  App. 277a-280a.  Among the various pieces of 
information he entered were Velazquez’s name, aliases,4 his 
alien registration number, his Social Security number, a 
physical description, his driver’s license, and the Box 2901 
address.  Id.  Entering Velazquez into the NCIC would allow 
any law enforcement agency, if it encountered Velazquez, to 
learn that he was wanted by checking his information against 
the database.  The law enforcement agent could then take him 
into custody after verifying that the government intended to 
prosecute.   
 
                                                                                                     
nationwide, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.” FBI — 
National Crime Information Center, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic (last visited Jan. 23, 
2014).  The database is organized by “files” that contain sets 
of records.  For example, Deputy Degan entered Velazquez’s 
information into the “Wanted Persons File,” which consists of 
records on individuals with outstanding warrants.  FBI —
 NCIC Files, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic/ncic_files 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2014).     
4
 The report states that Velazquez was also known as Sergio 
Velazquez-Payan and Sergio Payan.  App. 385a.  These are 
permutations of his surname from his father (Velazquez) and 
from his mother (Payan).  The government does not contend 
that these aliases are misleading.  They are, in fact, a common 
result of using Spanish surnames in the United States.  The 
report also uses “Velasquez,” but does not acknowledge this 
spelling change or label it an alias.  See App. 386a.   
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 Degan then prepared a collateral request, which is a 
request for investigative assistance from a Marshals Service 
office in another jurisdiction.  App. 175a-76a.  The request, 
dated October 7, 2005, sought help from the Marshals Service 
taskforce in the Los Angeles area, which consisted of 
marshals and local law enforcement officers.  See App. 284a-
85a, 385a.  Degan’s request noted the unfruitful trip to the 
Woodward Avenue address, mentioned that DEA agents from 
Los Angeles “also checked a number of other addresses” — 
without identifying the addresses — and then offered a 
number of leads in the form of past addresses for Velazquez, 
as listed in databases: 
 
- Velazquez’s mother’s name and a possible address 
for her in Pico Rivera, CA 
- The Box 2901 address 
- The address of a home in Bell Gardens, CA, that 
Velazquez appeared to have bought in 1999, and 
the name of a woman who bought it with him 
- The phone number Velazquez used during the DEA 
investigation, with an indication that Velazquez’s 
calls may have been made from a calling card 
- An address in Paramount, CA  
- The Woodward Avenue address and its possible tie 
to Velazquez’s brother, Elias 
- A Huntington Park, CA address associated with 
Cecilio Vasquez (relationship to Velazquez 
unknown) 
- A further address in Bell, CA, associated with 
Velazquez’s mother 
App. 385-86a.  The report concluded with this request, in 
relevant part: “Contact DEA [Special Agent] Scott Pascoe” 
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— the officer who had checked on the Woodward Avenue 
home — “regarding their efforts in Los Angeles to locate 
[Velazquez]” and “if all leads . . . are exhausted, please 
interview his parents” at the Pico Rivera address, “and his 
brother, Elias Velasquez.”  App. 386a.   
 
 C. Deputy Degan’s testimony about the response 
   to his report 
 
 Degan transferred from his position at the Marshals 
Service in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in late 
November 2005, about seven weeks after he sent his report.  
App. 290a.  At the district court’s hearing, Degan testified 
that, based on an exhibit showing that an officer at the Los 
Angeles Police Department ran a check for Velazquez 
through NCIC on October 31, 2005, it appeared that his 
collateral request was received.  App. 289a, 403a.  According 
to Degan, this NCIC check would have been “the first thing I 
would do before I’d go out and attempt to find him.”  App. 
289a.  Degan agreed that the exhibit did “not indicate that 
they went out and talked to anybody.”5  App. 296a.  Degan 
said that some communication between the requesting officer 
and the officer receiving the request would be by phone, but 
that it was standard practice to then make a written record of 
work done.  App. 298a.  He did not recall any 
                                              
5
 The district court stated that Degan “believed that work was 
underway on the request” because of the October 31 NCIC 
check, United States v. Velazquez, No. 2-05-cr-00432-003, 
2012 WL 2094061, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2012), but 
Degan’s testimony about the NCIC check only pertained to 
whether he thought the report was received, see App. 289a. 
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communications from the taskforce in Los Angeles about his 
request.  App. 289a-90a, 300a-02a.  
 
 D. Communication with Velazquez’s attorney;  
  superseding indictment 
 
 On November 1, 2005, an assistant U.S. attorney in 
Philadelphia sent a copy of the complaint and warrant to 
Velazquez’s counsel in California, Jerome Kaplan, and both 
sides stipulated below that Kaplan received these documents.
6
  
App. 232a.  The record does not explain how the assistant 
U.S. attorney knew Kaplan represented Velazquez, but 
Kaplan has represented that Velazquez hired him to contact 
the U.S. attorney to discuss a potential surrender.  Appellant’s 
Reply Br. 11.
7
  Three weeks later, a superseding indictment 
was filed, charging Velazquez with one count of conspiracy 
to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute five 
kilograms or more of cocaine, and one count of knowingly 
and intentionally distributing, and aiding and abetting the 
distribution of, five kilograms of more of cocaine.  See 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) (underlying drug statutes); 
21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and 
abetting).  The indictment was not sent to Kaplan.  App. 244a.  
After the indictment, the government did not communicate 
                                              
6
 The parties did not explore whether Kaplan told Velazquez 
about these documents because they agreed such testimony 
would implicate the attorney-client privilege.  
7
 The record does not disclose when Velazquez hired Kaplan 
for this purpose.  Kaplan is also Velazquez’s attorney on 
appeal.   
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again with Velazquez’s counsel.  Neither Kaplan nor 
Velazquez appeared at the arraignment in Philadelphia in 
December 2005.  Appointed local counsel entered an 
appearance on Velazquez’s behalf, but there is no indication 
that this counsel represented Velazquez in any further 
capacity, or told him of the indictment.  The assistant U.S. 
attorney stated at the arraignment that “my understanding 
from my last conversation with Mr. Kaplan was that he was 
planning to surrender Mr. Velazquez, but that has not 
happened.  And I have had no further contact with Mr. 
Kaplan . . . .”  App. 8a-9a (alterations omitted). 
 
 E. Marshals Service and DEA efforts from  
  November 2005 to November 2010 
 
 From November 2005 until November 2010, 
authorities checked the NCIC eight times to see if any law 
enforcement agency had encountered Velazquez.  App. 384a, 
392a-403a.  At the Marshals Service, someone in the 
Philadelphia office or the headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, 
checked the NCIC four of those eight times — in November 
2007, January 2008, February 2008, and September 2009.  Id.  
For his part, DEA Agent Pedrini in Philadelphia, one of the 
agents who had worked on the initial investigation, checked 
with the U.S. Attorney’s Office each year to make sure the 
office was still willing to prosecute.  He also made sure the 
warrant was still active in the NCIC, and he contacted the 
Marshals Service to ask if they had any new information.  
App. 158a-61a.
8
  Records show DEA inquiries on the NCIC 
                                              
8
 The district court stated that the efforts of the Marshals 
Service and DEA from November 2005 to November 2010 
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in January 2007, September 2007, October 2008, and October 
2010.  App. 392a-403a.  At some point, Pedrini put 
Velazquez on the “Most Wanted” section of the website for 
the DEA’s office in Philadelphia.  App. 160.9  He testified 
that he believed “we could” have put Velazquez on the “Most 
Wanted” section for Los Angeles, where authorities believed 
he was living, but “it didn’t happen.”  Id.  In 2008, for reasons 
unclear from the record, the warrant for Velazquez was 
removed from the NCIC.  Pedrini noticed the removal and 
contacted the Marshals Service, ensuring that the warrant was 
restored to the database.  See App. 158a-61a.   
 
                                                                                                     
included periodic checks of commercial databases (such as 
those that might reveal vehicle purchases).  Velazquez,  2012 
WL 2094061, at *4.  This observation is not supported by the 
testimony from Deputy Marshal Enrico Ilagan that the court 
cited.  See id.; App. 207a-08a (Ilagan clarifying that the 
example discussed happened in August 2005, as part of 
Deputy Degan’s work).  In an example not cited by the 
district court, Ilagan testified that he thought another deputy 
ran a check in January 2008 that included a commercial 
database.  App. 182a.  Ilagan was testifying about an exhibit 
outlining the investigation, but the relevant descriptions for 
two database checks in January and February of 2008 state 
only “NCIC Criminal History ran” and “NCIC check/No new 
info.”  App. 384a.  The government conceded in its closing 
argument before the district court that these were only NCIC 
checks.  App. 364a. 
9
 It is not clear at what point Pedrini took this step.   
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 There was no testimony or documentation before the 
district court to show any further steps taken to find 
Velazquez in this five-year period.  No law enforcement 
agency tried to visit the addresses Deputy Degan identified in 
his October 2005 collateral request for assistance; no one 
returned to the Woodward Avenue address where 
Velazquez’s brother lived; no one contacted his parents; no 
one contacted Agent Pascoe, the agent in Los Angeles who 
first checked the Woodward Avenue address, to find out what 
investigative steps had been taken; no one contacted Kaplan, 
Velazquez’s attorney, despite his conversation with a 
prosecutor before the indictment was issued; and no one 
conducted searches of commercial databases or other 
governmental databases beyond the NCIC.  Those other 
databases could have been particularly helpful.  They would 
have shown, for example, any new property records, traffic 
tickets, birth records, any records from the armed forces, or 
any immigration changes.  See App. 164a-68a (admission of 
Agent Pedrini that such records and databases were 
available); see also App. 230a (Deputy Marshal Enrico 
Ilagan’s similar testimony with respect to automobile 
records).   
 
 Degan testified that it was “standard practice” for an 
officer working on a case to make a written record of steps 
taken, but that it was not unusual that he had received no 
written response from the Marshals taskforce in Los Angeles 
before he transferred.  App. 298a-99a.  He suggested that the 
absence of a written response could mean that someone was 
still working on the investigation.  Id.  Nevertheless, there is 
no evidence that anyone on the Marshals taskforce in Los 
Angeles wrote a response to Degan’s report after Degan’s 
departure in November 2005.  It is not clear who had 
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responsibility for the investigation after Degan until 
November 2010, when Deputy Marshal Ilagan, also of the 
Philadelphia office of the Marshals Service, began working 
on the case.  App. 173a.  Degan testified that “these cases are 
considered a priority and it would have been reassigned to 
somebody.”  App. 290a.   Ilagan stated that he thought 
Deputy Marshal Cardinal, presumably in the same 
Philadelphia office,
10
 was working on the case at the time he 
started to work on it, but he did not know “how long she had 
the case,” and he could not say she was in charge over the 
interim five-year period.  App. 339a-40a.   
 
 F. Efforts from November 2010 to June 2011; new 
collateral request  
 
 Ilagan’s first step was to run an NCIC check, along 
with a search of a Lexis-Nexis database that compiles 
information from public and commercial records.  App. 174a-
75a, 194a-95a.  That search turned up Velazquez’s 
application to renew his California driver’s license, with a 
postal box address of Box 2037 (“Box 2037”) in Bell 
Gardens, CA, as well as a possible job for Velazquez at an 
auto repair shop in California.  App. 174a.
11
  Ilagan recalled 
                                              
10
 It appears Deputy Marshal Cardinal was in the Philadelphia 
office, as there is no indication in the record that someone 
outside that office was ever in charge of the case. 
11
 Ilagan did not recall where in California the shop was 
located.  App. 174a-75a.  The record shows that Velazquez 
began using the Box 2037 address at least by 2010.  See, e.g., 
App. 129a-31a, 136a.  Velazquez has represented that Box 
2037 and Box 2901 were in the same post office, Appellant’s 
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calling the garage and asking for Velazquez, but the business 
“didn’t know anything about him.”  Id.  Ilagan continued 
periodically to check databases.  In June 2011, he came 
across a possible connection between a phone number listed 
on Velazquez’s paperwork for Box 2901 and a new address in 
Norwalk, CA.  App. 175a, 186a; see also App. 388a.
12
  This 
possible connection led Ilagan to submit a new collateral 
request on June 22, 2011, for assistance from the Marshals 
Service taskforce in Los Angeles.  App. 42a-43a.  This 
request was the same type of request that Deputy Degan had 
written in 2005.  Ilagan identified the Norwalk address, noted 
that Velazquez was receiving mail at Box 2901, and that the 
residential address listed for that box was the Woodward 
Avenue address, an “old address” that Velazquez “used in the 
past.”  App. 388a.  Ilagan noted that it was not clear if there 
was any connection between Velazquez and the two people 
living at the Norwalk address, but that it was possible he was 
living there because it “is only 7 miles away from 
[Velazquez’s] relatives that live [in the] Bell Gardens, CA 
area.”  Id.  
                                                                                                     
Br. 12 n.2, and the government does not contest this point.  At 
some point Ilagan determined that both postal boxes were 
connected to the Woodward Avenue address that Velazquez 
at times listed for his home, and that turned out to be his 
brother’s house.  App. 189a; see also App. 388a. 
12
 It appears that Ilagan found the phone number Velazquez 
provided on the registration form for his postal box, and then 
searched phone records for any residence connected to that 
phone number.  See App. 388a.  This phone was different 
from the one Velazquez was said to have used during the 
DEA investigation.  Compare id. with App. 386a.     
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 G. Investigative steps in the summer of 2011 
 
 Ilagan’s request was received by the Marshals Service 
taskforce and assigned to Deputy David Dominguez in Los 
Angeles.
13
  On July 7, 2011, Ilagan received an e-mail 
notifying him that it appeared Velazquez had applied to 
renew his permanent resident card because the FBI received 
fingerprint submissions from the application that matched 
Velazquez’s prints on file.  App. 176a.  Ilagan informed 
Dominguez and then tried to get United States Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) to help apprehend 
Velazquez by arresting him when he went to the USCIS 
office to pick up his fingerprint card.  App. 177a.  The agency 
declined to help because of legal liability concerns.  Id. 
 
 Ilagan then suggested to Dominguez that he “might 
have to sit and do surveillance” at the Woodward Avenue 
address.  Id.  Dominguez did not testify before the district 
court, but he did take notes of the steps he took.  App. 314a-
15a, 414a.  Those notes reflect that he “sat surveillance” at 
the Woodward Avenue address on the afternoon of July 15, 
2011, noted license plate numbers for two vehicles in the 
driveway, but did not find Velazquez.  App. 414a.  He 
contacted Velazquez’s post office and learned that employees 
there recognized Velazquez, that Velazquez came often to 
                                              
13
 The record is silent on which law enforcement agency 
employed Deputy Dominguez.  This is the first time in the 
record that a Marshals Service taskforce officer in Los 
Angeles is identified by name as having responded to a 
collateral request for help in finding Velazquez. 
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collect his mail, but did not do so at a particular time.  Id.  At 
some point that summer Dominguez performed surveillance 
for half a day at the post office, without finding Velazquez.  
Id.  He also surveilled the Norwalk address on July 20, 2011, 
and went to an address in Baldwin Park, CA, that he thought 
might be connected to Velazquez.  Id.  None of these steps 
taken in the summer of 2011 was fruitful, nor was a search for 
payroll tax records for Velazquez.  App. 412a-13a, 323a-26a. 
 
 H. December 2011 apprehension and subsequent  
  guilty plea 
 
 Velazquez was apprehended on December 9, 2011, 
after police in Glendale, CA, arrested him on an unrelated 
narcotics charge.  App. 384a, 393a.  The DEA in Philadelphia 
confirmed that the government remained willing to prosecute 
Velazquez for the 2005 charges.  App. 161a-62a.  Velazquez 
was then served with the arrest warrant and extradited to the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Id.  
 
 On March 28, 2012, Velazquez filed a motion to 
dismiss the indictment on the basis of a speedy trial violation.  
App. 62a.  The district court denied the motion, Velazquez, 
2012 WL 2094061, finding that the government was 
reasonably diligent in pursuing Velazquez.  Thus Velazquez 
had to show specific prejudice to his defense from the long 
delay between indictment and arrest, and the court held that 
he did not make this showing.  Id. at *13 (citing Doggett v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992)).   
 
 To support its finding of reasonable government 
diligence, the court explained that the failed efforts to find 
Velazquez at the Woodward Avenue address in August 2005 
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and July of 2011 meant that “the government was unlikely to 
find defendant based on the information available to it as of 
November 2005,” and thus “the government reasonably 
elected to conserve its resources and wait for new information 
or a change in circumstances.”  Id. at *11.  The court also 
stated that the government’s reasonable efforts would have 
found Velazquez earlier if not for his “transient” lifestyle.  Id. 
at *10 (citing United States v. Mundt, 29 F.3d 233, 236 (6th 
Cir. 1994)).   
 
 Velazquez pleaded guilty on June 29, 2012, pursuant 
to a plea agreement in which he reserved his right to appeal 
the speedy trial issue.  He was sentenced in October 2012 to 
80 months in prison, with five years of supervised release.  
Velazquez then filed this timely appeal.
14
  We recount further 
facts below as needed for our analysis. 
 
II. 
 
 Barker established a four-factor test for evaluating 
whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been 
violated. The inquiry focuses on: (1) the length of the delay 
before trial; (2) the reason for the delay and, specifically, 
whether the government or the defendant is more to blame; 
(3) the extent to which the defendant asserted his speedy trial 
right; and (4) the prejudice suffered by the defendant.  407 
U.S. at 530-31.  “[N]o one factor is dispositive nor 
‘talismanic.’”  Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 770 (3d Cir. 
1993) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).  We review de novo 
                                              
14
 The district court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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the district court's legal conclusion that Velazquez failed to 
establish a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy 
trial; we apply clear error review to the factual findings 
underpinning that legal conclusion.  United States v. Battis, 
589 F.3d 673, 677 (3d Cir. 2009); Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 
F.2d 1431, 1437 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
 A.   Length of delay  
 
 The first factor is actually “a double enquiry,” 
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652: 
 
 Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, 
an accused must allege that the interval between 
accusation and trial has crossed the threshold 
dividing ordinary from “presumptively 
prejudicial” delay, since, by definition, he 
cannot complain that the government has denied 
him a “speedy” trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted 
his case with customary promptness.  If the 
accused makes this showing, the court must 
then consider, as one factor among several, the 
extent to which the delay stretches beyond the 
bare minimum needed to trigger judicial 
examination of the claim.  This latter enquiry is 
significant to the speedy trial analysis because . 
. . the presumption that pretrial delay has 
prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.  
Id. (citations omitted).  In other words, a court first decides 
whether the delay is long enough that it should trigger 
analysis of other Barker factors.  Id.  If it is, the length of the 
delay is also separately weighed in the court’s analysis of the 
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remaining factors.  Id.  The Supreme Court has noted that 
“the lower courts have generally found ‘postaccusation 
delay’” long enough to trigger further review of Barker 
factors “at least as that delay approaches one year.”  Id. at 652 
n.1.  This Circuit has concluded that a delay of fourteen 
months is “sufficient to trigger review of the remaining 
Barker factors,” Battis, 589 F.3d at 678 (citing Hakeem, 990 
F.2d at 760), and once that threshold has been passed, “the 
state, not the prisoner, bears the burden to justify the delay,” 
Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 770.   
 
 The district court correctly found here that the delay 
between the November 2005 superseding indictment and 
Velazquez’s scheduled trial date of July 2012 crossed the 
threshold of prejudicial delay to justify analysis of the 
remaining Barker factors.  The government concedes this 
point, Gov. Br. 25, and understandably so.  The Supreme 
Court has characterized delays on this scale as 
“extraordinary.”  See Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 (using that term 
to describe a delay between arrest and trial of over five 
years); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 (noting that “the 
extraordinary 8 ½ year lag between Doggett’s indictment and 
arrest clearly suffices to trigger the speedy trial enquiry”).  
Accordingly, we note the strength of Velazquez’s showing on 
this factor and move on to the heart of the appeal.  
 
B.   The reason for the delay 
 
 This factor, the “flag all litigants seek to capture,” 
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986), 
appropriately consumed the bulk of the district court’s 
analysis.  Doggett described the range of government effort to 
pursue an accused as extending from “reasonable diligence” 
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to “bad-faith delay.”  505 U.S. at 656.  With the former, the 
defendant's speedy trial claim will fail “however great the 
delay, so long as [the accused] could not show specific 
prejudice to his defense.”  Id.  Bad-faith delay, meanwhile, 
“would make relief virtually automatic.”  Id. at 657.  Between 
the two is a “more neutral reason such as negligence,” which 
weighs against the government, albeit “less heavily” than a 
deliberate or bad-faith delay.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.  
Negligence “still falls on the wrong side of the divide 
between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a 
criminal prosecution once it has begun.”  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 
657.  Just as the government has the burden to prosecute a 
case, it also has the burden to justify a delay once the Barker 
enquiry has been triggered.  See Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 770 
(citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 527).  If “the defendant is not 
attempting to avoid detection and the government makes no 
serious effort to find him, the government is considered 
negligent in its pursuit.”  United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 
758, 763 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653). 
 
 Negligence over a sufficiently long period can 
establish a general presumption that the defendant’s ability to 
present a defense is impaired, meaning that a defendant can 
prevail on his claim despite not having shown specific 
prejudice.  See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658 (finding a speedy 
trial violation based on general prejudice where government’s 
negligence led to six-year delay).  This general presumption 
applies because “impairment of one's defense is the most 
difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time's 
erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony ‘can rarely be 
shown.’” Id. at 655 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).  “Thus, 
we generally have to recognize that excessive delay 
presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways 
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that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.”  
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655. 
 
 This general presumption may be rebutted, but it is 
difficult to do so.  The prosecution is essentially put to the test 
of proving a negative — the absence of any prejudice to a 
defense from the passage of years.  See id. at 658 n.4 (noting 
the prosecution “ably counter[ed] Doggett’s efforts to 
demonstrate particularized trial prejudice [but] it has not, and 
probably could not have, affirmatively proved that the delay 
left his ability to defend himself unimpaired”) (emphasis 
added).  As Doggett further noted, such a test is demanding, 
but it should not surprise the government: 
 
[T]he weight we assign to official negligence 
compounds over time as the presumption of 
evidentiary prejudice grows.  Thus, our 
toleration of such negligence varies inversely 
with its protractedness, and its consequent 
threat to the fairness of the accused's trial.  
Condoning prolonged and unjustifiable delays 
in prosecution would both penalize many 
defendants for the state's fault and simply 
encourage the government to gamble with the 
interests of criminal suspects assigned a low 
prosecutorial priority.  The Government, 
indeed, can hardly complain too loudly, for 
persistent neglect in concluding a criminal 
prosecution indicates an uncommonly feeble 
interest in bringing an accused to justice; the 
more weight the Government attaches to 
securing a conviction, the harder it will try to 
get it. 
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Id. at 657 (citation omitted).   
 
 With these teachings in mind, we examine the two 
primary factual justifications for the district court’s 
“reasonable diligence” finding: (1) that the unfruitful trip to 
the Woodward Avenue address in 2005 and the investigative 
efforts in 2011 show that government inaction in the 
intervening years was a reasonable choice to “conserve [] 
resources,” Velazquez, 2012 WL 2094061, at *11, and thus 
comports with the requirements of reasonable diligence; and 
(2) that Velazquez had an elusive, if not evasive, lifestyle and 
thus bears responsibility for the delay, id. at *10.  We review 
the trial court’s determination that the government was not 
negligent with considerable deference.  See Doggett, 505 U.S. 
at 652.  The factual findings supporting that determination are 
reviewed for clear error.  “A finding is clearly erroneous 
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
body on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States 
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 
  1.  Reasonable choice 
 
 In its factual recitation, the district court stated that the 
Marshals Service and the DEA efforts to find Velazquez 
between November 2005 and November 2010 “were limited 
to periodic checks of the NCIC Wanted Persons database and 
the commercial databases.”  Velazquez, 2012 WL 2094061, 
at *4.  According to the court, this limited effort reflected a 
“choice” to pursue other leads from 2005 to 2010, given that 
earlier efforts initiated by Deputy Degan, and later work by 
deputies Ilagan and Dominguez, did not succeed.  See id. at 
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*10 (finding “the government’s choice to pursue other leads 
was reasonable”); see also id. at *11 (“The failure of the 
DEA’s efforts in California in 2005 and the inferred failure of 
the [Marshal Service’s] October 2005 collateral request show 
that the government was unlikely to find defendant based on 
the information available to it as of November 2005.  
Accordingly, the government reasonably elected to conserve 
its resources and wait . . . .”) (emphasis added).   In support 
of this conclusion, the court first stated that the October 31, 
2005, NCIC search, performed by someone at the Los 
Angeles Police Department, supported the inference that 
“authorities in California exhausted the leads in Deputy 
Degan’s collateral request.” Id. at *11.  It did not adopt this 
inference, however, finding that even if the Los Angeles 
Marshals Service taskforce made “only cursory efforts” to 
pursue those leads, the fact that investigative efforts in 2011 
did not quickly lead to Velazquez meant that any effort to 
find Velazquez “would likely have been fruitless.”  Id. 
 
 There are two related findings from the district court 
here: first, that there was a tactical choice not to pursue 
Velazquez; and second, even if there was no tactical choice, 
the inaction was effectively “harmless” because later 
investigation shows that any earlier effort would have been 
fruitless.  As an initial matter, we question the pertinence of 
either finding to the “reasonable diligence” inquiry here.  The 
Supreme Court observed in Doggett that even if law 
enforcement inaction “may have reflected no more than 
[defendant's] relative unimportance in the world of drug 
trafficking, it was still findable negligence.”  505 U.S. at 653; 
see also id. at 657 (“Condoning prolonged and unjustifiable 
delays in prosecution would both penalize many defendants 
for the state’s fault and simply encourage the government to 
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gamble with the interests of criminal suspects assigned a low 
prosecutorial priority.”).  We read this language to say that 
law enforcement priorities have little role to play in the 
negligence calculus.  If authorities choose to ignore available 
leads about a suspect’s whereabouts in favor of other tasks, 
they may nonetheless be found negligent within the context of 
the speedy trial right. 
 
 Furthermore, we find no evidence in the record to 
support a finding that investigators made an actual “choice” 
not to pursue Velazquez or that the failure to pursue him was 
in any event harmless.  Importantly, the government did not 
offer the tactical choice justification in the district court.  See 
App. 94a-95a (contending that Velazquez was evasive and 
fled).  The district court cited Deputy Ilagan’s testimony that 
his database checks in 2010 “came up with the same things 
that we already had” as the apparent reason the Marshals 
Service took no action from November 2005 to November 
2010 beyond checks in the NCIC.  Velazquez, 2012 WL 
2094061, at *5 (citing App. 226a).  But Ilagan’s testimony on 
what he did in 2010 does not shed light on possible tactical 
decisions made between 2005 and 2010. 
 
 With respect to that five-year period from November 
2005 to November 2010, Ilagan testified only that he worked 
with another deputy (Cardinal) when he took over.  But he 
did not know how long Cardinal had been handling the case 
or if anyone else had been in charge for any period since 
Degan.  Degan testified that “these cases are considered a 
priority and it would have been reassigned to somebody,” 
App. 290a, but the record does not support a finding that any 
particular individual — including Deputy Cardinal — was 
that somebody.  Consequently, there is no evidence of a 
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decision by anyone to forgo pursuit of Velazquez to conserve 
resources.  Indeed, given the priority status that Degan said 
would ordinarily have been given to such a case, the five 
years of inaction are more indicative of inattention than an 
affirmative judgment about resources.
15
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 Our dissenting colleague would affirm the district court 
because the court “heard the law enforcement witnesses and 
evidently believed that the limited investigative activity 
undertaken from 2005 to 2010 was the product of informed 
discretion.”  The district court did not hear from any witness 
who worked on the case during the five-year lull, nor did it 
hear from any witness who even claimed to be able to speak 
to decisions taken during that period.  Indeed, the government 
never advanced a conservation-of-resources argument before 
the district court, contending instead that “at no point did the 
Government cease in its attempts to locate” Velazquez, App. 
247a.  Just as it did for the “transient lifestyle” argument, see 
Section II.B.2, the government now adopts the district court’s 
reasoning on appeal.  Our colleague further contends that “[i]t 
is not beyond the pale to believe that the person responsible 
for the case was making decisions about how to work it.”  
Respectfully, we hold the view that such a belief requires 
some foundation in the evidence.  To the extent our colleague 
credits a possibility that Deputy Cardinal was the decision 
maker, this is an unsupported possibility that the district court 
did not even mention in its opinion.  To affirm the reasonable 
diligence finding of the district court on the facts of this case 
would effectively ignore the burden on the government to 
justify the lengthy delay, and would reduce clear error review 
to a mere formality.  Deferential review is still review.   
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 The district court’s finding that attentive pursuit would 
have been fruitless was similarly in error.  Degan’s collateral 
request to the Los Angeles Marshals Service taskforce in 
2005 set out multiple avenues for investigation that Degan 
considered promising at that time.  These included contacting 
the local DEA agent familiar with investigative steps already 
taken, exhausting the available leads, and interviewing 
Velazquez’s parents.  None of these actions was taken during 
the nearly six years that followed.  In the summer of 2011, 
however, Deputy Dominguez followed up on the new 
collateral request filed by Deputy Ilagan.  Among other leads, 
Dominguez learned that Velazquez came often to collect mail 
from at a postal office in Bell Gardens, and Dominguez 
conducted a half day of surveillance there.  Although 
Velazquez did not appear at the post office during those few 
hours, it does not follow that nothing would have come of a 
longer effort, or the same surveillance years earlier.  
Moreover, the post office lead might have been productive in 
2005 if combined with other steps urged by Degan in his 
request, such as interviewing family members in an attempt to 
gain insight into Velazquez’s daily habits at that time. 
 
 We thus cannot uphold the district court’s “reasonable 
diligence” conclusion based either on its finding that the law 
enforcement authorities made a reasonable tactical choice to 
limit their efforts to find Velazquez or its finding that the 
authorities’ limited effort was sufficient because more 
ambitious pursuit also would have been unsuccessful.  We 
therefore consider whether the court’s other articulated 
rationale — Velazquez’s lifestyle — adequately supports the 
finding of reasonable diligence during the period from 2005 
to 2011. 
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  2.   Defendant’s conduct 
 
 The government seeks to attribute the delay in 
apprehending Velazquez to his own conduct — which it 
characterizes as evasive — rather than to the lack of effort by 
law enforcement authorities.  At one point in its analysis, the 
district court appeared to agree that the evidence would 
support a finding of evasion.  The court reasoned that the 
government’s inability to find Velazquez at the Woodward 
Avenue address, his lack of employment history, and his 
“ability to avoid apprehension until his arrest on unrelated 
charges, even after the government intensified its efforts in 
2011” all “strongly supports the inference that defendant did 
hide.”  Velazquez, 2012 WL 2094061 at *10.  That inference 
would weigh heavily against Velazquez in assessing the 
government’s negligence.  See Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 766. 
 
 The court refrained from actually finding “evasion,” 
however, in favor of characterizing Velazquez’s lifestyle as 
“transient.”  Velazquez, 2012 WL 2094061 at *10.  In the 
court’s view, even if Velazquez did not deliberately conceal 
his whereabouts, his lack of permanence nonetheless was 
responsible for the government’s inability to find him sooner:   
 
“[W]hether or not defendant was intentionally 
evading authorities, his lifestyle made it 
difficult for authorities to track him down. If 
defendant had not been so transient and if he 
had lived at his mailing address instead of using 
post office boxes, he would have been found 
much earlier as the [government] used 
conventional search methods in a reasonably 
diligent manner.” 
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Id. (quoting Mundt, 29 F.3d at 236 (second alteration in 
original)).  The government did not frame its argument before 
the district court in terms of a “transient” lifestyle, see Gov. 
Response (App. 94a-96a), but it now adopts the district 
court’s reasoning as a separate ground for affirmance in 
addition to deliberate evasion, see Appellee’s Br. 31-34.   
 
 Although the district court ultimately refrained from 
finding “evasion,” we nonetheless believe we should assess 
that characterization because of its centrality to the 
government’s position and the court’s favorable view of it.  
Hence, we consider both whether the record supports a 
finding of deliberate evasion by Velazquez and whether the 
government can justify its meager search by blaming 
Velazquez’s “transient” lifestyle.  As we explain, neither 
inquiry favors the government. 
 
 With respect to evasion, the factors cited by the district 
court do not support the inference of bad motive that the 
government urged and the court almost drew.  A lack of 
verifiable employment, without more, does not signify an 
attempt to evade capture, and an individual’s choice to 
receive mail at a post office box or a relative’s home does not 
fill the gap.  Velazquez had used his brother’s address and 
Box 2901 for years before the DEA investigation began, 
including when he sought to enlist in the United States Naval 
Reserve in 2002-03.  Indeed, he used the same addresses in 
his 1998 application for a replacement Alien Registration 
Card.  App. 75a.  The duration of this usage negates any 
inference that these alternatives to a traditional home address 
were designed to protect him from a law enforcement 
manhunt.    
 
 29 
 
 Other evidence also undermines the inference of a 
furtive life.  Various documents from 2010 onward show that 
Velazquez consistently listed Box 2037 as his address, and he 
went to retrieve his mail at the post office so frequently that 
postal employees recognized him.  See, e.g., App. 130a 
(motorcycle title); App. 387a (driver’s license renewal).  
Velazquez listed the long-used Woodward Avenue address in 
paperwork for this postal box.  See App. 388a.  In addition, 
other public documents submitted during the period he was 
being sought also contained Velazquez’s name and 
identifying information.  See, e.g., App. 122a-27a (application 
in 2011 to replace alien registration card); App. 78a-82a 
(birth records for three children born between October 2005 
and February 2007).  In brief, we see no correlation between 
Velazquez’s lifestyle and an intention to hide.  Most 
significantly, there were no changes in his behavior over time 
that could be attributed to a deliberate effort after 2005 to 
evade detection. 
 
 We note that, as the government argues, the record 
would support a finding that Velazquez was aware that he 
was being sought in connection with the July 27, 2005 drug 
transaction in Philadelphia.  Indeed, his lawyer was in touch 
with the United States Attorney’s Office in the fall of 2005 — 
before Velazquez’s indictment — to discuss surrender.  
Velazquez had no duty to bring on his own trial, however, 
and his lawyer’s inquiry does not diminish any governmental 
negligence in failing to pursue him, or to even contact his 
lawyer again.  See Barker, 407 U.S. at 527 (“A defendant has 
no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty.”) 
(citing Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37-38 (1970)); see 
also Dickey, 398 U.S. at 50 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The 
accused has no duty to bring on his trial.”); Mendoza, 530 
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F.3d at 763 (noting that “it was not [defendant’s] 
responsibility to contact the government during the 
investigation”).  Although knowledge by Velazquez that he 
was being sought could contribute to an inference of evasion, 
it does not make the conduct we describe above more 
suggestive of hiding.  Absent evidence of evasive conduct, 
Velazquez’s knowledge does not aid the government’s 
argument. 
 
 As for justifying the government’s inaction based on 
Velazquez’s “transient” life, we have serious doubts that this 
characterization is helpful in the reasonable diligence inquiry.  
To be sure, the government can only pursue reasonably 
available leads, and the absence of a paper trail for a 
defendant might leave the government with fewer avenues for 
investigation.  Our focus is not the type of life a suspect leads, 
however, but whether the government has diligently used the 
information available to it.  Describing a defendant as 
“transient” adds little to this analysis.  Indeed, it carries the 
risk that the label will be used as a substitute for a detailed 
factual assessment of the government’s investigation, diluting 
the “serious effort” that Doggett requires of law enforcement 
authorities.  505 U.S. at 652.  Moreover, this risk would likely 
be felt disproportionately by those in more limited economic 
circumstances, unfairly lessening the Sixth Amendment 
speedy-trial protection for those who are not so fortunate as to 
be well-rooted in society.
16
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 We note that the “transient” lifestyle comment in Mundt on 
which the district court relied added little to the analysis in 
that case.  The government periodically checked for the 
defendant at two motels and had verified that he occasionally 
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 We thus conclude that neither premise for the district 
court’s finding that the government did not act negligently — 
a supposed alternative allocation of resources and the 
defendant’s way of life — withstands scrutiny.  Hence, the 
court clearly erred to the extent it relied on those findings to 
hold that the government satisfied the “reasonable diligence” 
prong of the Barker test, and we therefore afford no deference 
to the court’s determination on negligence.  Nevertheless, we 
must still consider whether the record supports the adequacy 
of the government’s efforts.  See Burkett, 951 F.2d at 1441 
(noting that, where district court erroneously attributed delay 
to the defendant and, hence, did not make a prejudice finding, 
appeals court “must exercise our power of plenary review to 
determine if the testimony establishes sufficient qualitative 
prejudice to weigh this factor in [defendant’s] favor”).  In so 
doing, we continue to defer to the district court’s findings of 
fact as to the underlying events that are not clearly erroneous.         
  
  3.  The reasonable diligence determination 
 
 To satisfy the requirement of reasonable diligence, the 
government does not need to make “heroic efforts” to pursue 
a suspect, Rayborn v. Scully, 858 F.2d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 1988), 
but it must at least make a “serious effort,” Doggett, 505 U.S. 
at 652.  If “the defendant is not attempting to avoid detection 
and the government makes no serious effort to find him, the 
                                                                                                     
stayed at each one.  See 29 F.3d at 235.  Investigators also 
tracked records in two states, leading to surveillance at his 
credit union until he showed up and was arrested.  Id.  The 
government thus had shown reasonable diligence in pursuing 
the leads it had available.  
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government is considered negligent in its pursuit.”  Mendoza, 
530 F.3d at 763 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653).  Here, it is 
essentially undisputed that the government made only 
minimal attempts to find Velazquez in the five years between 
Degan’s transfer in November 2005 and Ilagan’s assumption 
of control over the investigation in November 2010.  The sum 
total of its activity was limited to checking the NCIC eight 
times and, perhaps, placing Velazquez on the “Most Wanted” 
list for the Philadelphia DEA office. 
 
 Although we doubt that such negligible effort could be 
deemed “serious” in any circumstances, we need not 
speculate in this case about how far short of the mark it fell.  
Deputy Degan’s collateral request in 2005 detailed the 
measures he thought advisable in tracking down Velazquez, 
and we believe his prescription for the investigation is a 
helpful guidepost in assessing whether the government met 
the standard of reasonable diligence.
17
  In addition to 
recommending follow-up with DEA Agent Pascoe, who had 
visited the Woodward Avenue home at the request of the 
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 Our dissenting colleague disagrees with our use of Deputy 
Degan’s collateral request as guidance in the reasonable 
diligence analysis, contending that we turn each suggestion 
into a “requirement[].”  We do no such thing.  The pertinent 
point here is not that the taskforce missed a particular 
suggestion on Degan’s list, but rather that — as the 
government explicitly acknowledges — there is no evidence 
that anyone from the Los Angeles Marshals taskforce visited 
any of the addresses linked to Velazquez’s close relatives that 
were identified in Degan’s 2005 request.  See Appellee’s Br. 
43. 
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Philadelphia DEA office, Degan listed a number of addresses 
that the Marshals Service taskforce could explore if DEA 
agents had not already done so.  He expressly asked that 
Velazquez’s parents and brother be interviewed if all other 
leads had been exhausted.  None of this was done. 
 
 Nor did authorities attempt to reach Velazquez during 
this period.  They could have sent mail to his PO box or the 
Woodward Avenue address or sought out a relative to relay a 
request that Velazquez turn himself in.  Cf. Mendoza, 530 
F.3d at 763 (“Based on its previous success in contacting 
[defendant], the government was negligent when it failed to 
attempt to inform [him] of the indictment by calling [his 
family].”)  Additionally, no contact was made with his 
attorney throughout the five years. 
 
 On this record, we think it plain that the government 
was not reasonably diligent in its pursuit of Velazquez.  For 
the reasons we have explained, the district court’s contrary 
determination was clearly erroneous.
18
  The second Barker 
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 We recognize, as did the district court, that speedy-trial 
cases are intensely fact-bound and thus of limited value as 
precedent. Velazquez, 2012 WL 2094061, at *11; see also 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 (“A balancing test necessarily 
compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc 
basis.”).   Nevertheless, we have reviewed United States v. 
Spaulding, 322 Fed. App’x 942 (11th Cir. 2009), and United 
States v. Walker, 92 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 1996), the cases relied 
upon by the district court and government respectively.  Both 
support the finding that the government is responsible for the 
delay in finding Velazquez.  Spaulding involved government 
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factor — the reason for the delay — squarely favors 
Velazquez.
19
   
                                                                                                     
effort far more extensive and consistent than was the case 
here, including months of government surveillance, efforts to 
trace the defendant’s mail from his postal box, and calls to 
him to ask him to return.  322 F. App’x at 944.  The 
defendant in Walker, unlike Velazquez, had fled after posting 
bail on state drug charges, and was on the run at the time he 
was indicted for federal drug charges.  92 F.3d at 715.  He 
also used a false identity, making his evasiveness obvious.  
Id. at 716. 
19
 Courts have also examined speedy trial claims by assigning 
responsibility for specific periods of the delay, and then 
weighing the delay attributable to the government.  See Battis, 
589 F.3d at 680; see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657-658 
(identifying six years of the delay from indictment to arrest as 
attributable to the government and using that portion to find 
general presumption of trial prejudice to the defendant).  We 
have concluded that the government was not reasonably 
diligent for the five-year period from November 2005 until 
November 2010.  See Battis, 589 F.3d at 678 (“[D]elay is 
measured from the date of arrest or indictment, whichever is 
earlier, until the start of trial[.]”).  We can assume the 
government was diligent from November 2010 until the arrest 
in December 2011, a period of about thirteen months.  The 
remaining delay from arrest to the projected trial date is 
neither side’s fault.  Thus, to find the government diligent 
here would require finding that thirteen months of diligence 
outweighed a period of negligence that was more than four 
times as long.  We decline to so hold. 
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 C. Defendant’s assertion of the right 
 
 The third Barker factor requires a court to examine 
“[w]hether and how a defendant asserts his [speedy-trial] 
right,” 407 U.S. at 531, including “the frequency and force” 
of such assertions, id. at 529.  The district court found it 
unnecessary to make any findings on this factor because it 
had already rejected Velazquez’s speedy trial motion on the 
basis that the government was reasonably diligent and 
Velazquez could not show specific prejudice.  Hence, the 
court simply assumed that Velazquez timely asserted his right 
by filing a motion to dismiss within four months of his arrest.  
Given this posture of the case, we resolve this factor based on 
the undisputed facts in the record. 
 
 The Supreme Court noted in Barker that the 
fundamental “right to a speedy trial is unique in its 
uncertainty as to when and under what circumstances it must 
be asserted or may be deemed waived.”  Id. at 529.  Barker 
attempted to plot a path through this uncertainty by rejecting 
a rigid rule that a defendant waives his speedy-trial right “for 
any period prior to which he has not demanded a trial.”  Id. at 
525.  The Court observed that such an approach presumed the 
“waiver of a fundamental right from inaction,” id. (footnote 
omitted), which is inconsistent with the definition of waiver 
as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Given such a high standard for establishing waiver, “[c]ourts 
should indulge every reasonable presumption against 
waiver . . . [and] not presume acquiescence in the loss of 
fundamental rights.”  Id. at 525-26 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
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 The Barker Court also rejected the notion that “the 
defendant has no responsibility to assert his right.”  Id. at 528.  
Instead, it held that the issue of waiver — “the defendant’s 
assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial” — 
would be one of the factors to consider on a case-by-case 
basis in balancing the defendant’s and government’s conduct.  
Id.  The Court emphasized that while the defendant bears 
“some responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim,” the 
prosecution retains the burden to show the knowing and 
voluntary waiver of a fundamental right.  Id. at 529.  Thus a 
defendant’s limited responsibility to assert his speedy trial 
right exists alongside the government’s overarching burden to 
prove waiver of that fundamental right.  Applying its rule in 
Barker, the Court considered the defendant’s failure to object 
to eleven continuances lasting a total of more than three-and-
a-half years, followed by the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
and his opposition to several further continuances.  See 407 
U.S. at 517-18.  In that setting, where the defendant had 
ample opportunity to object in court, the defendant raised a 
“close” case, id. at 533, but ultimately a losing one.   
 
 Barker’s teachings necessarily left uncertainty about 
when a defendant would be obligated to assert his speedy-trial 
right if the defendant is at large.  In considering this issue in 
Doggett, the Court observed that an at-large defendant’s 
knowledge of a pending indictment could weigh heavily 
against him on this Barker factor, even if he was not evading 
capture.  505 U.S. at 653.  In Velazquez’s case, the 
government has argued that knowledge of charges, rather than 
the subsequent indictment, should weigh heavily against him.  
Although the Doggett Court did not explicitly announce that 
the defendant’s awareness of the indictment — rather than 
knowledge of earlier events, such as an investigation or an 
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arrest warrant — was the critical measuring point, such a rule 
is consistent with longstanding principles governing a 
defendant’s speedy trial rights. 
 
 This proposition is evident from the Court’s 
examination of the scope of a Sixth Amendment speedy trial 
claim in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).  In 
rejecting the defendants’ contention that their Sixth 
Amendment right had been violated by a three-year delay 
between the end of their criminal activity and the return of the 
indictment, the Court emphasized that “the Sixth Amendment 
speedy trial provision has no application until the putative 
defendant in some way becomes an ‘accused,’” through 
indictment or arrest.  Id. at 313.  The Court noted that the 
“public act” of an arrest “may seriously interfere with the 
defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and . . . 
may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, 
curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and 
create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.”  Id. at 320.  
With this impact in mind, the Court observed, “it is readily 
understandable that it is either a formal indictment or 
information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and 
holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular 
protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Id.  Given the concerns arising from an arrest, 
“[i]nvocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not wait 
indictment, information, or other formal charge,” but the 
Court refused to extend the “reach of the amendment to the 
period prior to arrest.”  Id. at 321. 
 
 It is thus well established that the constitutional speedy 
trial clock does not start for an individual who has not yet 
been arrested until an indictment has issued.  See id. at 320;  
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Battis, 589 F.3d at 678 (“In general, delay is measured from 
the date of arrest or indictment, whichever is earlier, until the 
start of trial.”).  The Speedy Trial Act also looks to arrest or 
indictment to start the clock.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) 
(requiring that a defendant be charged within thirty days of 
the date he was arrested or served with a summons); id. 
§ 3161(c)(1) (requiring that trial begin within seventy days of 
indictment/information or first court appearance, whichever 
occurs later).  It would thus be odd to conclude that the 
defendant has a duty to assert his speedy trial right before 
either indictment or arrest — i.e., at a time when he does not 
yet have such a right.  Hence, the Court’s focus in Doggett on 
the indictment, without an explicit statement that it is the 
pivotal event for an at-large defendant’s assertion of his 
speedy trial right, undoubtedly stems from the previously 
recognized importance of that formal charge. 
 
 We note that, in its discussion of the underlying events 
in Doggett, the Supreme Court observed that there was no 
evidence the defendant was aware of the pre-indictment 
charges against him.  See 505 U.S. at 653.  Although that 
statement has led some courts to look to knowledge of the 
charges apart from knowledge of the indictment, see, e.g., 
United States v. Tchibassa, 452 F.3d 918, 926 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (noting that “[t]he Doggett Court appeared concerned 
generally with Doggett’s awareness vel non that charges were 
pending against him rather than with his specific knowledge 
that a formal indictment had been filed”), we see the Court’s 
observation as compatible with a focus on the indictment.   If 
the defendant did not even know of the charges against him, 
he necessarily did not know of the later-rendered formal 
indictment that started the speedy trial clock.  Indeed, the 
Court twice pointed to knowledge of the “indictment” as 
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pertinent, and we cannot conclude that the Court meant to 
modify this measuring point through its discussion of the 
evidence.
20
  Other circuits also have treated knowledge of the 
indictment as the necessary inquiry.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Molina-Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(focusing on defendant’s knowledge of the indictment 
pending against him); Mendoza, 530 F.3d at 763 (same).   
 
 Having identified knowledge of the indictment as the 
appropriate measure for the timely assertion of the speedy 
trial right, we turn to the evidence in the record, keeping in 
mind the government’s burden to demonstrate Velazquez’s 
knowledge.  See Barker, 407 U.S. at 529.  Although 
Velazquez’s attorney contacted the U.S. Attorney’s Office to 
discuss a possible surrender, and the attorney stipulated that 
he received a copy of the arrest warrant and the pre-
indictment charges, there is no evidence that either he or 
                                              
20
 However, as we previously noted, supra at 24-25, a 
defendant’s knowledge of the investigation or charges, apart 
from knowledge of the indictment, might bear on the second 
Barker factor, the reason for the lengthy delay, as this 
knowledge might inform a finding that the defendant was 
evading authorities.  This overlap has been noted in the case 
law.  Justice Brennan combined what later became the second 
and third Barker factors in a concurrence in Dickey, reasoning 
that consideration of the defendant’s assertion of the speedy-
trial right overlaps with consideration of who was responsible 
for the delay.  398 U.S. at 48 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
The Court in Barker noted that “there is little difference 
between [Justice Brennan’s] approach and the one” it 
adopted.   407 U.S. at 530 n.30.   
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Velazquez was later told of the indictment.
21
  The indictment 
was not sent to the attorney, App. 244a, and the government 
did not communicate with him after the indictment was 
issued.  On this record, the most we can say is that Velazquez 
learned of the indictment at the time of his arrest.  See 
Molina-Solorio, 577 F.3d at 306-07 (construing a lack of 
evidence that defendant knew of the indictment as weighing 
in the defendant’s favor).  Velazquez brought his speedy-trial 
motion within four months of his arrest, and thus we count 
this factor in his favor.   
 
 D. Prejudice suffered by the defendant 
 
 As noted, the district court found that the government 
was reasonably diligent in pursuing Velazquez, and it thus 
required Velazquez to show specific prejudice to his defense 
from the lengthy delay before trial, or as it happens here, his 
conditional guilty plea.  Velazquez, 2012 WL 2094061, at *13 
(citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656).  Because the court erred 
when it found reasonable diligence, its prejudice analysis 
compounded that error.  Instead of analyzing whether the 
government could overcome the general presumption that 
“excessive delay . . . compromises the reliability of a trial in 
ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify,” 
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655,
22
 it found that “defendant failed to 
                                              
21
 The government argued that he must have known of the 
charges.  The court, however, made no findings on 
knowledge of the indictment. 
22
 Doggett identified three types of harm caused by 
“unreasonable delay between formal accusation and trial”:  
oppressive incarceration, the accused’s increased anxiety, and 
 
 41 
 
identify any specific witness or piece of evidence that he now 
cannot access,” Velazquez, 2012 WL 2094061, at *14. 
 
 To “warrant granting relief, negligence 
unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must have 
lasted longer than negligence demonstrably causing such 
prejudice.”  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657.  The Court in Doggett 
found that the durational requirement for relief without 
specific prejudice was met where the delay attributable to the 
government’s negligence was six years, an amount that “far 
exceeds the [one-year] threshold needed to state a speedy trial 
claim.”  Id. at 658.  The defendant was entitled to relief 
because the presumption of general prejudice was not 
“persuasively rebutted.”  Id.   
 
 The government contends that, even if the general 
presumption of prejudice applies, it has met its burden of 
rebuttal by affirmatively showing that Velazquez’s defense is 
unimpaired.  The government notes that the critical meetings 
and phones calls in the case were all recorded and that 
Velazquez’s co-defendants have previously testified about the 
pertinent events — leaving the evidence intact, and without 
the risk of fabrication, despite the trial delay.  App. 163a.  
The district court accepted the government’s contentions and 
                                                                                                     
“the possibility that the accused’s defense will be impaired by 
dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.”  505 
U.S. at 654 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here only the 
last harm is at issue.  It is “the most serious . . . because the 
inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews 
the fairness of the entire system.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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held, as part of its discussion of specific prejudice, that the 
government had rebutted any showing of general prejudice.  
Velazquez, 2012 WL 2094061, at *13. 
 
   The government’s reasoning is flawed in two ways.  
First, it equates the preservation of evidence the government 
would rely on with the materials Velazquez might need to 
challenge the government’s case.  The Court in Doggett 
recognized that “impairment of one’s defense is the most 
difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because 
time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony can 
rarely be shown.”  505 U.S. at 655 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Not only may Velazquez plausibly claim that his 
own recollection of the events at issue has eroded, but he also 
has argued that the passage of time makes it harder to 
investigate an entrapment defense or find witnesses to “his 
whereabouts and involvement.”  Velazquez, 2012 WL 
2094061, at *13.  Forecasting how faded memories could 
harm him is precisely the sort of difficult-to-obtain proof that 
supports the finding of general prejudice in a case of 
extraordinary delay. 
 
 Second, the government’s argument in effect turns its 
burden to disprove general prejudice on its head by 
suggesting that its rebuttal effort must be found successful 
unless Velazquez can identify prejudice.  In Doggett, the 
Court noted that the government “ably counter[ed] Doggett’s 
efforts to demonstrate particularized trial prejudice [but] it 
has not, and probably could not have, affirmatively proved 
that the delay left his ability to defend himself unimpaired.”  
505 U.S. at 658 n.4 (emphasis added) (citing H. Richard 
Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets A Fast Shuffle, 
72 Colum. L. Rev. 1376, 1394-1395 (1972)).  The Court thus 
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indicated that the government faces a high, and potentially 
insurmountable, hurdle in seeking to disprove general 
prejudice where the period of delay is extraordinarily long.
23
  
                                              
23
 In the passage of Professor Uviller’s article that the 
Doggett Court cited as sufficiently analogous to lend support, 
Uviller recognized that this burden on the prosecution to 
prove a negative could be “unfair since it may require proof 
by facts inaccessible to the state.”  Uviller, supra at 1394.  He 
nonetheless argued for such a burden:  
How can the state prove that no evidence for the 
defense was lost or impaired? . . . Proof of a 
negative is always difficult and in this instance, 
it may be contended, the task is impossible 
since the critical facts are known only to the 
defendant. Further, the argument would run, 
where the prosecutor must demonstrate 
harmless error at trial, he may do so from the 
record; but since he cannot show lack of 
prejudice by record citations, a parallel burden 
would be inappropriate to impose. 
 The argument is not without merit. 
Realistically, prejudice lies beyond the capacity 
of either side to prove or disprove, except in the 
rare instance where a known defense witness of 
known competence actually disappears or 
reports a recent impairment of memory, and no 
prior testimony from him is available. 
Therefore, the shift of burden actually permits 
the presumption of prejudice to prevail on the 
issue. Since that presumption is well-founded, 
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Perhaps the government could make that showing in another 
case, but it has not done so here.  The presumption of general 
prejudice, triggered by the government’s extraordinary delay 
in bringing Velazquez to trial, continues to favor the 
defendant in the application of the Barker speedy trial test. 
 
III. 
 
 We recognize the significance of our decision.  A 
defendant who pleaded guilty to serious drug charges will no 
longer have to answer those charges.  But we accept such rare 
outcomes as the necessary cost for the protection of the 
speedy trial right set forth in the Constitution.  Here, with 
respect to the first factor in the Barker analysis, the length of 
the delay in bringing Velazquez to trial was extraordinary by 
any measure.  Contrary to the conclusion of the district court, 
the government was not reasonably diligent in pursuing the 
defendant.  Indeed, its pursuit of the defendant was strikingly 
inattentive for five years.  Hence, the reason for the delay, the 
                                                                                                     
however, justice is served. The establishment of 
prejudice, albeit presumptively, does not end 
the inquiry; it merely focuses attention on other 
elements wherein impropriety or justification 
may be more meaningfully discerned.   
Id. at 1394-95 (emphasis added).  We need not resolve in this 
case whether general prejudice is irrebutable when the period 
of delay is extraordinarily long.  We simply note that, in 
citing the above passage for support, the Doggett Court was 
keenly aware of the practical difficulties for the prosecution 
in making such a rebuttal. 
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second and most important factor in the speedy trial analysis, 
strongly favors the defendant.  The third factor — the timely 
assertion of the speedy-trial right — benefits the defendant.  
As to the fourth factor, the government did not overcome the 
presumption of general prejudice that applies with 
considerable force in a case of such extraordinary delay.  
Under these circumstances, all of the Barker factors support 
the defendant's claim of a violation of his speedy trial right.  
We must therefore reverse the district court's judgment of 
conviction and the related sentence.  The indictment against 
Velazquez must be dismissed with prejudice.  We remand for 
that purpose.  
1 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting  
 
Whether Sergio Velazquez’s constitutional right to a 
speedy trial was violated is a close question, and, as my 
colleagues in the Majority point out, the answer hinges 
largely on the reasons for the delay in bringing him to trial.  
The primary issue is whether the government exercised 
reasonable diligence to find him, or, to phrase it differently, 
whether the government was negligent in its investigation.  
My colleagues reject the District Court’s determination that 
the government was not negligent, although that Court held 
an evidentiary hearing, carefully considered all of the 
evidence, and thoughtfully explored the factual and legal 
disputes.  I think the Majority is mistaken.  While the 
government’s investigative efforts fell well short of 
praiseworthy, they were not so lacking that, on this record, 
the District Court’s decision should be seen as reversible 
error.  Given that conclusion, and the District Court’s finding 
that Velazquez did not demonstrate specific prejudice from 
the delay, we should affirm.  I therefore respectfully dissent 
from giving Velazquez a pass for dealing in multiple 
kilograms of cocaine. 
 
I. 
 
Considering the government’s obligation to exercise 
reasonable diligence in bringing a defendant to trial is an 
intensely fact-specific inquiry.  “[T]he precise amount of 
effort that is required is apt to vary depending on the 
circumstances of the case,” Rayborn v. Scully, 858 F.2d 84, 
90 (2d Cir. 1988), so understanding the facts is particularly 
important.  That, of course, is something that district courts, 
with their fact-finding capacity, are best suited to accomplish, 
2 
 
and we are thus obliged to view a district court’s 
determination of reasonable diligence with, as the Supreme 
Court has put it, “considerable deference.”  Doggett v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992).  We must review the 
District Court’s underlying factual findings regarding a 
speedy trial claim for clear error, United States v. Battis, 589 
F.3d 673, 677 (3d Cir. 2009), and would be well-advised to 
think of “considerable deference” in the same terms, given 
the context.
1
  A finding of fact is, as my colleagues note, 
clearly erroneous “only if we are left with a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States 
                                              
1
 There is a persuasive argument that the “considerable 
deference” standard for the reasonable diligence 
determination is simply another way of saying “clearly 
erroneous review.”  In referencing “considerable deference,” 
the Supreme Court in Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, cited Cooter 
& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401-02 (1990) 
(“The [Supreme] Court has long noted the difficulty of 
distinguishing between legal and factual issues. … The 
considerations involved in the Rule 11 context are similar to 
those involved in determining negligence, which is generally 
reviewed deferentially.”), and McAllister v. United States, 
348 U.S. 19, 20-22 (1954) (finding, in an admiralty case, that 
a district court’s findings of negligence were not clearly 
erroneous).  The Doggett Court also cited a section of Wright 
and Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure discussing 
negligence cases and stating that the “natural” reading of 
McAllister is that “a determination of negligence is reviewed 
under the ‘clearly erroneous’ rule.”  9 Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2590 (1st 
ed. 1971); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652. 
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v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 199 (3d Cir. 2007).  It is not enough 
to be left with lingering questions.
2
 
 
The Majority takes issue with two conclusions of the 
District Court: that the few investigative steps taken by the 
government between 2005 and 2010 may be excused in light 
of the more intense but fruitless efforts that preceded and 
followed that period, and that Velazquez’s off-the-grid 
lifestyle contributed to the delay.  While I acknowledge that 
fair-minded people can differ about inferences and 
conclusions to be drawn from the record, I do not have a 
definite and firm conviction that the District Court erred in its 
handling of those essentially factual issues or in its ultimate 
conclusion of reasonable diligence. 
 
My colleagues begin by asserting that “law 
enforcement priorities have little role to play in the 
                                              
2
 We review legal conclusions regarding a speedy trial 
claim, including the balancing of the Barker factors, de novo.  
See Battis, 589 F.3d at 677; Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 
771 (3d Cir. 1993).  The Supreme Court has held that no 
single factor is “either a necessary or sufficient condition,” 
and the factors “must be considered together with such other 
circumstances as may be relevant.”  Barker v. Wingo, 407 
U.S. 514, 533 (1972).  Even accepting my colleagues’ 
conclusions regarding the length of delay in this case and 
Velazquez’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, however, a 
defendant’s speedy trial claim will typically fail when the 
government has demonstrated reasonable diligence and the 
defendant has failed to show specific prejudice.  See Doggett, 
505 U.S. at 656. 
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negligence calculus.”  (Maj. Op. at 24.)  I disagree and think 
it plainly relevant to consider the likelihood that an 
investigative step will bear fruit when considering what 
actions constitute reasonable diligence.  The concept of 
“reasonableness” is itself dependent upon circumstances.  
“Reasonable diligence” necessarily incorporates the notion 
that specific circumstances, including but not limited to the 
constraints operating on the government, factor into what 
constitutes a reasonable investigative effort.  The Majority 
relies on the Supreme Court’s statement in Doggett that “even 
if law enforcement inaction ‘may have reflected no more than 
[defendant’s] relative unimportance in the world of drug 
trafficking, it was still findable negligence.’” (Id. at 23 
(quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653).)  That statement, 
however, does not indicate that prosecutorial judgment about 
how best to deploy law enforcement resources should be 
given little or no weight.  It was made in conjunction with the 
observation that, had government agents in that case tested 
“their progressively more questionable assumption that 
Doggett was living abroad, … they could have found him 
within minutes.”  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53.  In other 
words, under the specific circumstances of that case, the 
lower prosecutorial priority assigned to the defendant did not 
offset the government’s utter failure to act on developments 
indicating his whereabouts.
3
  Id.  It bears repeating that “the 
                                              
3
 I recognize the Supreme Court’s concern that 
“[c]ondoning prolonged and unjustifiable delays in 
prosecution would both penalize many defendants for the 
state’s fault and simply encourage the government to gamble 
with the interests of criminal suspects assigned a low 
prosecutorial priority.”  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657.  However, 
for the reasons discussed herein, the delay here was not 
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precise amount of effort that is required is apt to vary 
depending on the circumstances of the case.”  Rayborn, 858 
F.2d at 90. 
 
The Majority claims that there is “no evidence in the 
record to support a finding that investigators made an actual 
‘choice’ not to pursue Velazquez.”  (Maj. Op. at 24.)  That is 
not entirely true.  Notably, the District Court found that, after 
Deputy Degan’s departure, someone continued to work the 
case, and the Majority acknowledges that that person may 
have been Deputy Cardinal.  It is not beyond the pale to 
believe that the person responsible for the case was making 
decisions about how to work it.  To the extent my colleagues 
demand a clearer record that some “particular individual” 
made the decision “to forgo pursuit of Velazquez” (id. at 24-
25), they miss the mark.  Government decision-making at its 
best is the product of a deliberative process in which costs 
and benefits are weighed and reflected in a well-kept record.  
But decision-making is not always as carefully done or as 
clearly preserved as we would like, and yet we do not assume 
that government actions are random.  The District Court 
                                                                                                     
unjustifiable.  While I do not advocate blind deference to 
executive decisions about the allocation of law enforcement 
resources, I do believe that requiring constant government 
activity in fugitive cases, regardless of the prospects that such 
activity will bear fruit, may rightly be perceived as 
unwelcome and unnecessary judicial meddling in the 
executive sphere.  There is ample room to disagree with 
executive decisions on resource allocation before one arrives 
at the point where a constitutional violation should be 
declared. 
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heard the law enforcement witnesses and evidently believed 
that the limited investigative activity undertaken from 2005 to 
2010 was the product of informed discretion.  I am not 
prepared to say that was clearly erroneous.
4
  Nor am I willing 
to fault the District Court for thinking that later, more 
intensive but equally fruitless investigation could be seen as 
some vindication of an earlier government decision to do less.  
It is true that one cannot say that later failure proves – in a 
deductive sense – that earlier efforts would have failed, but 
                                              
4
 Although, as my colleagues point out, the District 
Court did not hear directly from any law enforcement officer 
who worked on the case between 2005 and 2010, there was 
certainly circumstantial evidence that somebody worked on it 
after Deputy Degan’s departure.  For example, Deputy Degan 
testified that someone in the Marshals Service would have 
been assigned to the case, and somebody in the Marshals 
Service did indeed run period NCIC checks between 2005 
and 2010.  In addition, DEA Agent Pedrini made sure that 
Velazquez’s warrant remained active in the NCIC during that 
time and was in contact with the Marshals Service to see if 
there was any new information on the case.  The Majority 
seems to think that the level of deference I believe should be 
given to the District Court’s “reasonable diligence” ruling 
amounts to no review at all.  (See Maj. Op. at 25 n.15.)  That 
is a basic disagreement.  I believe a reasonable inference that 
someone was assigned and working the case can be drawn 
from the record, and, again, under clear error review, I am not 
left with a definite and firm conviction that, in light of the 
totality of the circumstances, the District Court erred in 
concluding that the work done was sufficient to constitute 
reasonable diligence. 
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those points of failure may add up inductively to allow a 
reasonable mind to determine that earlier decisions to do less 
were grounded in something better than sheer laziness. 
 
The Majority makes too much of the fact that there is 
no record of the government taking all of the investigative 
steps suggested by Deputy Degan in 2005.  The District Court 
was well aware that there was “no direct evidence that 
authorities in California exhausted the leads in Deputy 
Degan’s collateral request.”  (App. at 20a.)  However, it 
found that the additional leads were “far more speculative 
than [Velazquez’s] connection to the Woodward Avenue 
address” (id.), and it credited Deputy Degan’s “belie[f] that 
work was underway on [his] request” (id. at 7a).  In other 
words, the Court accepted the deputy’s understanding of how 
the Marshals Service works, and it was entitled to do so.
5
   
                                              
5
 I note parenthetically my disagreement with any 
implication in the Majority opinion that Deputy Degan’s 
suggested list of investigative steps should be viewed as the 
measure of reasonable diligence.  (Maj. Op. at 32.)  Though 
my colleagues disclaim relying on it (see id. at 32 n.17), a 
reader might nonetheless conclude that the references to that 
list are meant to give it weight.  One officer’s investigative 
suggestions to another on the opposite side of the country, 
however, may vary from what the receiving officer’s local 
experience tells him will and will not be worthwhile.  That 
difference of opinion does not make the receiving officer a 
slacker.  Moreover, we risk building a perverse incentive into 
the system if we turn suggestions into requirements.  There 
may be fewer suggestions committed to paper if deputy 
marshals believe that courts will turn unfollowed leads into 
“stay out of jail free” cards for fugitives. 
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There is no dispute that, between August and 
November 2005, the government entered information about 
the charges against Velazquez into NCIC,
6
 searched other 
databases for information, sent the 2005 collateral request to 
authorities in California to seek help, and visited the 
Woodward Avenue address, all to no avail.  Between 
November 2005 and November 2010, the government 
periodically ran Velazquez’s name through NCIC and made 
sure that the warrant was still in the system.
7
  No additional 
leads surfaced until a database check in November 2010 
                                                                                                     
 
6
 “NCIC,” as the Majority notes, is the acronym for the 
National Crime Information Center, a database of criminal 
justice information. 
 
7
 Velazquez relies on United States v. Fernandes, 618 
F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 2009), and United States v. Mendoza, 
530 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that merely 
entering names into a database – as he characterizes the 
government’s efforts between November 2005 and November 
2010 – is insufficient to meet reasonable diligence.  As the 
District Court noted, however, both cases are distinguishable 
because they are extradition cases involving fugitive 
defendants who had left the country.  Periodically entering a 
fugitive’s name into a national warrant database when the 
individual is believed to still be in the country, as is the case 
here, provides some chance that the fugitive might be found 
by authorities somewhere within the United States.  It cannot 
be compared to doing the same for a fugitive believed to be 
outside of the country, in which case extradition is “the most 
obvious step” to bring that person promptly back for trial.  
Fernandes, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 71. 
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revealed a new place of employment for Velazquez.  Given 
those circumstances, it was not clearly erroneous for the 
District Court to conclude that deputies could “infer[] failure” 
would have dogged further pre-2010 efforts in California to 
find Velazquez.  (Id. at 21a.)  It was, in turn, not clearly 
erroneous to decide that “the government reasonably elected 
to conserve its resources and wait for new information or a 
change in circumstances.”  (Id.) 
 
My colleagues in the Majority also reject the District 
Court’s determination that, purposefully or not, Velazquez’s 
decisions made it difficult for the government to find him.  
The Majority does acknowledge that “the absence of a paper 
trail for a defendant might leave the government with fewer 
avenues for investigation” (Maj. Op. at 30), but it gives that 
fact short shrift and instead expresses concern that taking 
account of a fugitive’s “transient” lifestyle “would likely be 
felt disproportionately by those in more limited economic 
circumstances” (id.).  That concern is more a matter of 
speculation than proof at this point, but, assuming it is true, 
that does not address the investigative reality confronting the 
government both generally and in this case specifically.  First, 
as a general matter, law enforcement decisions made under 
budgetary constraints and without any hint of improper 
motivation should not be overturned because of a vague 
concern that being hard to find is peculiar to the poor.
8
  More 
specifically, however, in this case there was significant 
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 There may be significant challenges tracking people 
at the other end of the economic scale too, since a person of 
means who is constantly traveling or moving among multiple 
addresses may be as difficult to find as someone who is not 
well-rooted in society. 
10 
 
evidence indicating that Velazquez was quite deliberately 
hard to find, which is understandable since, as the Majority 
notes, “the record would support a finding that Velazquez 
was aware that he was being sought in connection with the 
[underlying] drug transaction.”  (Id. at 29.)  The District 
Court thought it unnecessary to take the final step of 
concluding that Velazquez was deliberately evading 
authorities, though it did note that the evidence “strongly 
supports the inference that [Velazquez] did hide.”  (App. at 
20a.)  That evidence, and the District Court’s comment on it, 
should make us leery of overturning the Court’s 
determination that the government’s investigative efforts 
were reasonably diligent under the circumstances. 
 
In sum, while law enforcement officers certainly could 
have done more to search for Velazquez, particularly between 
2005 and late 2010, they were not obligated to take every 
possible action and chase every lead.  See Rayborn, 858 F.2d 
at 90 (noting that the government must exercise only “due 
diligence” and not “heroic efforts”).  Given the considerable 
deference that we must give the District Court’s finding of 
reasonable diligence, I would accept it and turn attention to 
the question of prejudice. 
 
II. 
 
 Because the government sufficiently demonstrated 
reasonable diligence, the District Court required Velazquez to 
show that he would suffer specific prejudice, not just general 
prejudice, from the passage of time in order to prevail on his 
speedy trial claim.  That decision was in keeping with the 
Supreme Court’s instruction in Doggett, in which the Court 
held that, when the government has been negligent in its 
11 
 
investigation and the delay is excessively long, “consideration 
of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable,” 
and defendants may claim prejudice without providing 
“affirmative proof of particularized prejudice.”  Doggett, 505 
U.S. at 655.  Conversely, if the government can show that it 
“pursued [a defendant] with reasonable diligence from his 
indictment to his arrest” – as the District Court concluded the 
government did here – then the defendant’s right to a speedy 
trial claim will fail, regardless of the length of delay, unless 
the defendant can show specific prejudice to his defense.  Id. 
at 656. 
 
The Majority rightly notes that in general there are 
three types of prejudice that can result from delay: (1) 
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) the defendant’s anxiety 
and concern over the outcome of the litigation; and (3) 
impairment of the defense.  Battis, 589 F.3d at 682.  The 
prejudice that Velazquez asserts is impairment of his defense. 
 
“[T]he possibility that the … defense will be impaired 
by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence” is 
the most important form of prejudice faced by a defendant 
when his right to speedy trial is denied.  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 
654 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972) (“[I]nability of a defendant 
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire 
system.”).  Generally, the burden of showing prejudice is on 
the individual claiming the violation, see Hakeem v. Beyer, 
990 F.2d 750, 760 (3d Cir. 1993), and the mere “possibility of 
prejudice is not sufficient to support [the] position that 
… speedy trial rights were violated.”  United States v. Loud 
Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986) (emphasis added).  In 
Hakeem v. Beyer, one of the defendants argued that he would 
12 
 
suffer prejudice because the delay prevented him from calling 
witnesses to corroborate his alibi defense to robbery.  990 
F.2d at 763.  We rejected that argument, holding that, absent 
extreme circumstances, “[g]eneral allegations that witnesses’ 
memories have faded are insufficient to create prejudice.”  Id. 
 
As the District Court observed, Velazquez “relies 
almost exclusively on the general assertion that he is 
prejudiced by the passage of time because witnesses to his 
whereabouts and involvements may be impossible to locate 
and those witnesses that are available will have impaired 
memories.”  (App. at 25a (internal quotation marks omitted).)  
I agree with the District Court that Velazquez’s claims in this 
regard are “too general and too speculative” to demonstrate 
specific prejudice.  (Id.)   
 
Velazquez also argues that his ability to investigate an 
entrapment defense has been impaired.  As the Court pointed 
out, however, the informant’s conversations with Velazquez 
on July 3, 2005 and those that took place over the phone were 
recorded, and the testimony from co-defendants Pedro Curiel 
and Nelson Gutierrez-Gainza at Gutierrez-Gainza’s trial is 
available.  Velazquez “failed to identify any specific witness 
or piece of evidence that he now cannot access.”  (Id. at 26a.)   
 
Because Velazquez did not carry his burden of proving 
particularized prejudice, the District Court correctly 
determined that, under the circumstances of the case, he did 
not demonstrate a right to relief. 
III. 
 
This case presents a serious question regarding the 
unusual delay between indictment and trial, but I believe the 
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District Court handled the matter wisely and well, and I 
would therefore affirm its decision that Velazquez’s 
constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.  I thus 
respectfully dissent. 
